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Anthropological Foundation of the Levels of Happiness: 
Robert Spitzer, Abraham Maslow and Leonardo Polo1. 
John Branya, Strathmore University, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to see how Leonardo Polo’s Transcendental 
Anthropology can give a foundation to the levels of happiness of Robert 
Spitzer, in his work: Healing the Culture and the hierarchy of basic needs 
of Abraham Maslow.  Spitzer distinguishes four levels of happiness 
according to the inner tendencies of the human being, which he names in 
Latin as “laetus, felix, beatitudo and gaudio”. Maslow orders the basic 
human needs from physiological to safety, love, esteem, and finally self-
actualization. This paper observes that a) both Spitzer and Polo are in 
agreement with the perennial philosophy views about happiness and b) 
that Polo gives a trans-metaphysical (transcendental) grounding to a 
personal consideration of the last two levels analysed by Spitzer and c) 
that Maslow bases his analysis in dynamic psychology, and tends to mix 
Spitzers’ last three levels in his three last levels of needs. 
 
                                                 
1 Paper read at the 23rd World Congress of Philosophy in Athens on 11th August 2013. 
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 It is interesting to see how the Transcendental Anthropology of 
Leonardo Polo can give an ontological foundation to the levels of 
happiness proposed by Robert Spitzer (Spitzer, 2000) and to the 
hierarchies of basic needs of Abraham Maslow (Maslow, 1943). Spitzer 
bases his proposal in cultural philosophy, Maslow in psychology, and 
Leonardo Polo (Polo, 2003) in the ontological structure of the person. 
 As Robert Spitzer indicates happiness (eudaimonia) is one of the 
most frequent topics in religion, philosophy and psychology. Happiness is 
related to perfection, and it is viewed as the motivation of human actions.  
 “The purpose of education from the days of the Greek Academy to 
the present has been to help students to move from the immediately 
gratifying to the enduring, from the apparent and superficial to the deep, 
from the narrow and intensive to the pervasive. This is why these four 
levels of happiness have found their way into so many philosophies, 
psychologies and anthropologies. They are not simply part of our inner 
makeup. They are really a culmination of many cultures’ reflections on the 
common good and the purpose of education.” (Spitzer 64) 
 It is difficult to find views about happiness that are entirely new and 
that cannot be traced in previous authors. Nevertheless Robert Spitzer, 
Abraham Maslow and Leonardo Polo are somehow original. Spitzer uses 
the tools of cultural philosophy to summarize the achievements of the 
previous authors in four levels and relates happiness to the culture in 
which people are immersed. 
 “With respect to its use as cultural philosophy, I have found the Life 
Principles to be useful in business, nonprofit organizations, law firms, 
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university and high school environments, and even nursing homes and 
hospitals.” (Spitzer 15) 
 Polo gives a new outlook to the metaphysical and anthropological 
foundations of happiness which blends very well with the systematization 
done by Spitzer, and can also give a foundation to Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs. We shall start with a schematic description of each proposal using 
the most relevant texts of each author and conclude attempting to blend 
their proposals in an integrated way. 
 In the bibliography we include links to short biographies of Spitzer R. 
(Spitzer, n.d.), Maslow, A. (Hoffman, 1988) and Polo, L. (“Intellectual 
Trajectory of Leonardo Polo - Leonardo Polo Institute of Philosophy,” n.d.) 
  
Spitzer’s four levels of Happiness,  
 
 Spitzer considers happiness in the classical sense of satisfaction of 
innate desires. 
 “Desire is not linked only to purpose; it is also linked to happiness. In 
general, when my desires are fulfilled, I am happy. When my desires go 
unfulfilled, I am unhappy. Perhaps the most general definition of 
happiness is ‘the fulfillment of desire’ (whether that desire be superficial or 
sublime). Likewise the most general definition of unhappiness might be 
the nonfulfillment of desire: frustration, continual heartache, and 
yearning. In sum, happiness is linked to desire; desire to purpose; and 
therefore, happiness to purpose.” (Spitzer 59) 
 Happiness is also considered a cultural category in the sense that it 
influences how society views the aim or purpose of the person, which is 
directly related to human dignity and that the present cultural 
environment does not appreciate because of its minimalist and 
materialistic point of view. 
 “These ten categories (of cultural discourse) include happiness, 
success, quality of life and love; suffering; ethics and freedom; and 
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person, rights and the common good. Unfortunately, because the ten 
categories are intangible, they too are underestimated and undervalued.” 
(Spitzer 28) 
 “Metaphysical materialism tends to reduce reality to matter. 
Frequently matter is interpreted not in light of late twentieth-century 
physics (for example, quantum theory, relativity theory, big bang 
cosmology) but rather in terms of what is tangible, clearly perceived, and 
clearly understood (for example, colors, solids, locomotion). This type of 
materialism tends to view reality as building blocks that are clearly 
perceived by individuals and even clearly within their control.” (Spitzer18) 
 The four levels of happiness are a systematic way to analyze the 
ultimate reasons that motivate human decisions and consequently human 
behavior. The author gives brief description of the four levels of 
happiness: physical gratification, ego-gratification, contribution and 
transcendence.  
 “Much of this book will be concerned with four levels of meaning and 
purpose in life. (…) Suffice to say that the first level of meaning (physical 
pleasure and possession) and the second level (ego-gratification) are quite 
tangible, immediately gratifying, and emotionally intense. The third and 
four levels of meaning (concerned with contribution and love –level 3- and 
transcendence and faith –level 4) require delayed gratification, education 
and subtlety, but they have pervasive effects beyond a single person, last 
much longer, and involve our most creative powers (for example, love, 
ideals, intellectual creativity, and the pursuit of the common good).” 
(Spitzer 23) 
 The characteristic of the first level laetus is seen as physical pleasure 
or sensitive gratification which is intense but short-lived and because of 
this requires repetition, creates habituation that leads to increasing 
demands. It can also lead to the destruction of the organic base that 
causes pleasure. The second level felix is the level of ego-gratification, 
where achievement of wealth, recognition, power is sought. It is a 
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competitive level, where the ego has to be ahead of other egos, and 
recognition of the supremacy is the main motor. This level may lead to 
jealously, anxiety, bitterness and trampling of other egos. Spitzer points 
out that these two levels are self-centred and that as such do not satisfy 
completely the aspirations of the human being. Humans will not be 
satisfied until their transcendental aspirations are met. These 
transcendental aspirations are met partially in level three beatitudo where 
the ego goes beyond himself and gives himself to another “who”, 
discovering his own “who”. While this level is more authentic, more 
human, more personal, still the only level that can fulfill the personal 
desires for transcendence is the fourth level “gaudio”. At the gaudio level 
is where God as person can give full recognition to the desire of total 
happiness which is purely spiritual and therefore unattainable by created 
beings. 
 
Maslow’s theory of motivation 
 
 As indicated before Maslow’s approach to happiness is exclusively 
based on psychological observations. Maslow does not use the term 
happiness in his paper. For him the satisfaction of the desires, or 
motivations, is what constitutes the motor of human behaviour.  
 “The present paper is an attempt to formulate a positive theory of 
motivation which will satisfy these theoretical demands and at the same 
time conform to the known facts, clinical and observational as well as 
experimental. It derives most directly, however, from clinical experience. 
This theory is, I think, in the functionalist tradition of James and Dewey, 
and is fused with the holism of Wertheimer Goldstein, and Gestalt 
psychology, and with the dynamicism of Freud and Adler. This fusion or 
synthesis may arbitrarily be called a 'general-dynamic' theory.” (Maslow, 
1943, p. 372). 
 Man motivations, though, cannot be reduced to animal motivations. 
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 “This theory starts with the human being rather than any lower and 
presumably 'simpler' animal. Too many of the findings that have been 
made in animals have been proven to be true for animals but not for the 
human being. There is no reason whatsoever why we should start with 
animals in order to study human motivation. The logic or rather illogic 
behind this general fallacy of 'pseudo- simplicity' has been exposed often 
enough by philosophers and logicians as well as by scientists in each of 
the various fields. It is no more necessary to study animals before one can 
study man than it is to study mathematics before one can study geology 
or psychology or biology.” (Maslow, 1943, p. 393). 
 “That this truism can be forgotten is due mainly to two reasons. 
First, rats have few motivations other than physiological ones, and since 
so much of the research upon motivation has been made with these 
animals, it is easy to carry the rat-picture over to the human being.” 
(Maslow, 1943, p. 375). 
 What is more relevant of Maslow’s theory for our purpose is the list 
and explanation of the five levels of needs that motivate human beings.  
 “There are at least five sets of goals, which we may call basic needs. 
These are briefly physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization. 
In addition, we are motivated by the desire to achieve or maintain the 
various conditions upon which these basic satisfactions rest and by certain 
more intellectual desires.” (Maslow, 1943, p. 395). 
 Man, rather than seeking a situation of homeostasis, or perfect 
satisfaction, is eager to develop all his capacities, which makes him an 
active changer, will not be ever really satisfied.  
 “I should then say simply that a healthy man is primarily motivated 
by his needs to develop and actualize his fullest potentialities and 
capacities. If a man has any other basic needs in any active, chronic 
sense, then he is simply an unhealthy man.”  (Maslow, 1943, 395). 
 “Man is a perpetually wanting animal. Also no need or drive can be 
treated as if it were isolated or discrete” (Maslow, 1943, 370). 
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 Finally, another interesting statement is that no desire or motivation 
works in isolation, but they are all intertwined and never fully satisfied, 
due to the incapacity to satiate all his desires. 
 “Thus man is a perpetually wanting animal. Ordinarily the satisfaction 
of these wants is not altogether mutually exclusive, but only tends to be. 
The average member of our society is most often partially satisfied and 
partially unsatisfied in all of his wants.” (Maslow, 1943, 395). 
 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is a psychological ranking of needs, 
which goes from the most basic life needs to the highest. Tough he 
suggests that only higher needs are taken into consideration when the 
lower are satisfied, he defends that not all need to be totally satisfied. He 
also defends that there are interrelated and that they are exceptions in 
singular cases.  
 “As for the concept of emergence of a new need after satisfaction of 
the prepotent need, this emergence is not a sudden, saltatory 
phenomenon but rather a gradual emergence by slow degrees from 
nothingness. For instance, if prepotent need A is satisfied only 10 per 
cent: then need B may not be visible at all. However, as this need A 
becomes satisfied 25 per cent, need B may emerge 5 per cent, as need A 
becomes satisfied 75 per cent need B may emerge go per cent, and so 
on.” (Maslow, 1943, 388). 
 For our topic what is interesting is that Maslow makes a classification 
of motives, of human desires in an increasing order of importance and 
that he also says that the desires of man are never satisfied; man has an 
inner force which moves him always ahead, always looking for more. This 
is one of the characteristics that Spitzer has clearly pointed out and that is 




The transcendental structure of man according to Polo 
 
 After seeing the cultural and psychological approach to a hierarchy of 
happiness and satisfactions we discuss whether Leonardo Polo’s 
Transcendental Anthropology can give an ontological foundation to the 
findings of Maslow and Spitzer. 
 Polo uses de classical definition of happiness recognizing his debt to 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.  
 What is the natural will fixed to so precisely and exclusively? To what 
does it inflexibly tend? Thomas Aquinas says to happiness (ST 1.41.2 ad 
3m; 1.2.4 ad 2m). This is an old idea that comes from Aristotle 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1.7 [1097b ss]). The human being as a spiritual 
being tends by nature to happiness. The human being cannot but tend to 
happiness, and this means that with respect to happiness there is no 
choice. The human being cannot tend to misfortune, to a physical evil, or 
to any other thing, but only to something which makes him happy. The 
vegetative functions tend to fulfill their task and are fixed ad unum in 
accord with it. But the end of our spiritual natural tendency, being fixed ad 
unum, is not to nourish itself or things like that, but happiness. (Polo, 
2008, p. 4)  
 “Duty is compatible with happiness because happiness consists in the 
possession of the ultimate good.” (Polo, 1994) 
 Polo agrees with both philosophers in that the desire of happiness is 
embedded in our will, which is of the will as nature -voluntas ut natura- 
before it is actualized by the intelligence -voluntas ut ratio. According to 
Polo the classic Greek words are orexis for the voluntas ut natura and 
boulesis for voluntas ut ratio. 
 “But in so far as we are beings that are not animals, we human tend 
in a special way that is linked to our reason. This tendency that is not 
merely biological, because reason can influence it and it obeys reason, this 
special órexis is called boúlesis by the Greeks. The Medieval philosophers, 
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upon receiving the Greek heritage, translated the two Greek concepts as 
voluntas. They called the will as tendency voluntas ut natura. Voluntas ut 
natura is the radical act of desire of our spirit. They called boúlesis -which 
is not another faculty, but a phase, a development of the voluntas ut 
natura in so far as it is related to human reason—voluntas ut ratio.” 
(Ethics,149) 
 Polo does not speak of levels of happiness but the triadic structure of 
the human being can explain them. He arrives at the triadic structure by 
distinguishing a new level which transcends the hylomorphic composition 
of body and soul and the hylomorphic composition between them. This 
new level goes beyond the hylomorphic structure by being a purely formal 
distinction between the human essence and his act of being. This third 
level is the level of the personal act of being, which makes each person 
radically different from each other person. He posits that Thomas Aquinas 
discovered this fundamental distinction but did not use it in anthropology.  
 “Effectively the soul is the immortal part of human nature and 
because of this it is detachable from the body. But it is not only a 
“quidditas” but also an essence really different from the human “esse” 
inasmuch as it is habitually perfected. Summing up, the originating 
(“principial”) character of the soul has to be dealt with care. Because of its 
dependency of the human being the soul cannot be properly a principle.” 
(Polo, 1999, p. 140)  
 “Specifically my proposal starts from Tomas Aquinas’ real distinction 
between the esse and the essence, which is the last important discovery 
of traditional philosophy. (…This) Thomistic discovery can be expanded, or 
better used, when studying in recto (directly) the human being; this is if 
the act of being human, which is the person, which should be 
distinguished from the human essence.” (Polo, 1999, p. 19)  
 Following this clarification he distinguishes three levels: the natural, 
the essential and the personal. At the natural level the human being “has” 
(tener = to have, to possess). This level roughly coincides with what the 
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classics considered the human body, and the sensitive and affective levels 
that are linked to it. The essential level, which is exclusive of human 
beings is where the human rational faculties of the intelligence and the 
will are located.  All human beings coincide in having intelligence and will 
which are the acting powers for human activities. This is the level of 
‘doing’ (hacer = to do). 
 And finally the personal level -the personal act of being- where each 
human being is irreplaceable, unique, and where the four personal 
transcendentals have their seat.  
 “The link between these dimensions of the co-existence is clear: the 
improvement of the universe is linked to the improvement of the human 
essence. Nevertheless, the ultimate meaning of the human co-existence, 
by which the human person accepts himself radically, beyond ‘having’ and 
‘doing’, and gives himself, decides his own destiny (se destina en su ser). 
The free intimate of his giving [here LP is referring to the personal level] 
should be more radical that the immanence of ‘having’ [he is talking of the 
natural level] and even more radical than the immanence of the virtue [he 
is referring to the essential level]. Intimacy is what strictly defines the 
person: a being who is capable of giving, of adding, as the only way to 
countersign his ‘having’ and ‘being’ ”.(“IEF Leonardo Polo,” n.d.) 
 “Certainly, in each human being the person is dual with the essence 
and this is dual with nature. But the human essence is not a replica of the 
person. And because the essence is not a replica, the replica has to be 
sought in other persons. These dualities; the person with the essence, and 
the person with the replica, are not the highest. If there was only one 
person, and nothing else, the person will be unknown, and the dualities 
will disappear. This will not only be a disaster, it is impossible; because 
nothing human will be real if there were no personal co-existence. 
Because of this I have proposed the expansion of the transcendentals.” 
(Polo, 1999, p. 179)  
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 In the same way than in metaphysics the transcendentals transcend 
the categories -they are beyond the categories- because they apply to all 
beings, the personal transcendentals transcend the different types of 
persons and are therefore common to all persons, for the mere fact of 
being a person. Polo describes four personal transcendentals: co-
existence-with, personal freedom, personal knowledge and personal love. 
 “Consequently, in the first place, it is suggested that the theory of 
the transcendentals can be expanded, that the transcendentals discovered 
and somehow coordinated by traditional philosophy –which I call 
metaphysical transcendentals- can be distinguished from the other 
transcendentals which I call personal transcendentals.” (Polo, 1999, p. 31) 
  “The anthropological transcendentals are achieved as thematic value 
of the character of the “additional” (además). These transcendentals are: 
the act of being of the person, which I call co-existence, intimacy of 
second act of being; the intellectual transparency, that I call intellectus ut 
co-actus; the love that accepts, which is the donation structure of the 
person; and freedom.”  (Polo, 1999, p. 216)  
 Co-existence-with is the one we are interested now because it is the 
one that expresses the way of being of the persons, which is different 
from the way of being of non-personal realities. A person alone cannot be 
thought, he is intimacy that by design has to be shared, he has to be in a 
personal relationship with other beings. These other beings can be at the 
same personal level –in our case human beings- but in a deeper way has 
to be the person who is the origin of the persons, the absolute “replica” 
who can reflect and quench all capabilities and potentialities of the person 
and therefore make him or her known finally to himself or herself. 
  “A second consideration with regards to the duality is to say that 
what is deepest in human beings is the person and the personal being is 
incompatible with monism. A unique person will be the absolute disaster 
because he/she will be condemned to have no replica; on the other hand, 
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a person can only have as replica another person.” (“IEF Leonardo Polo,” 
n.d.)  
 Suffice for this brief article this description of Polo’s transcendental 
anthropology which will make possible to compare it with Spitzer’s levels 
of happiness and Maslow’s hierarchy of basic needs. 
 
The integration of the psychological and cultural in the 
ontological 
 
 Polo’s first anthropological level, the natural level, can be an 
ontological support to the first level of happiness, laetus or satisfaction 
described by Spitzer. The first gratification is the fulfillment of the natural 
passions of the biological component of human nature. Whatever is 
received, whatever is acquired in a physical way gives us the immediate 
satisfaction or corporal satisfaction. This level is common, but not 
identical, with the animals, who also have needs and feelings that require 
satisfaction. It can also be the foundation to the physiological and safety 
needs as described by Maslow. Nevertheless one has to take into account 
that Maslow’s safety needs also include safety of live projects, which only 
men by the fact of their spiritual nature can plan. For Polo this level is 
exclusively on the sensitive, not intellectual realm. 
 Polo’s second level, the essential level, is the level of the felix or 
“achievement”. The second level of happiness is the fruit of the 
achievements that our intelligence proposes and that our will conquers. 
Success requires planning, challenges, foreseeing the future. It requires 
the ability to distinguish between ends and means, and the constancy of 
implementing the decisions taken in spite of the difficulties that may arise. 
This level can appease Maslow’s needs for esteem, and self-actualization, 
whenever they do not involve the personal donation, which correspond to 
Spitzer’s third and fourth level of happiness, and Polo’s personal level. 
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 While Polo does not explicitly make a distinction in his texts because 
he does not really deal with level of happiness, he distinguishes the 
relationship with God at a personal level and the relationship with other 
persons who are at our own level.  
 The relationship of person to person is done through the intelligence 
and will, This is done at the essential level where we communicate and 
recognize that there are other egos, other persons. To treat them as 
persons and not as ‘projects’ or ‘means’ we have to go out of ourselves, to 
reach the level of acceptance and donation, that for Polo are two 
ingredients of personal love. This is Spitzer’s third level of happiness, 
which is the first level where the person is unselfish, and where beatitudo 
is achieved. This can also be Maslow’s level of love. Maslow’s love is not 
as precisely described as Spitzers’ and Polo’s though he clearly does not 
reduce it to sex. 
 “One thing that must be stressed at this point is that love is not 
synonymous with sex. Sex may be studied as a purely physiological need. 
Ordinarily sexual behavior is multi-determined, that is to say, determined 
not only by sexual but also by other needs, chief among which are the 
love and affection needs. Also not to be overlooked is the fact that the 
love needs involve both giving and receiving love.” (Maslow, 1943, p. 
382). 
 Lastly Spitzer’s fourth level of happiness gaudio can be linked to the 
person to person relationship between the person at the personal level 
and God as a person. Polo speaks of a double way a person can know 
God: one through the intelligence, through the arguments of the existence 
of God, the second in a personal relationship as the fulfillment of the 
intimate desire at the personal level of finding the plenitude of the 
personal relationship both as origin and end. These arguments allow us to 
relate with God as creator, unique, omnipotent, first cause uncaused, 
perfect good and perfect truth, perfect beauty and its own being, where 
there is no distinction between His act of being and His essence, and the 
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personal God who can be “touch” as a person, through the innate habitual 




 Abraham Maslow gives a psychological dymanic view of human 
motivation, based on the analysis of the needs and their satisfaction. He 
affirms that they are hierarchical and interconnected and that in no time 
man is fully satisfied. He gives accurate facts, good descriptions and 
valuable hypothesis. He does not attempt to find the causes, which is 
beyond his discipline. 
 Robert Spitzer gives a cultural classification of the levels of happiness 
based on very valid and vivid observations of society, and the works of 
classic philosophers. His ranking is based on the spiritual nature of human 
beings and their desire for what is permanent and transcendent. Beauty, 
good and truth, can only be achieved in a direct relationship with God at 
the highest level of happiness, which encompasses the other three levels. 
 Leonardo Polo suggests an ontological structure of the person that 
can explain well the valuable findings of the two previous authors, and 
help us understand more in depth the causes and consequences of the 
descriptions given by them. Polo’s explanations require a deeper 
knowledge of his theory of knowledge and his Anthropology, not an easy 
task but full of rewards because even if unknown by most, is one of the 
philosophers that has the potential to contribute more to the development 
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 BARRIO, J.M. 
 La innovación educativa pendiente: formar personas. 
 Erasmus Ediciones, Barcelona, 2013. 
 
 Después de leer el libro en cuatro o cinco tragos, y dejado pasar un 
“cooling period”, que es la denominación inglesa del periodo de prudente 
enfriamiento para decantar cualquier determinación, la impresión inicial es 
muy favorable en el aspecto de su redacción, su claridad expositiva, su 
recurso a fuentes relevantes, y por el tratamiento de los conceptos 
nucleares de una idea de educación, concebida como “conocer a las 
personas y ayudarlas a crecer” (p.15). En este sentido, sinceramente 
tengo que decir que he disfrutado durante la lectura, he refrescado viejas 
categorías y conceptos, y equilibrado su importancia, tanto en relación con 
una propuesta filosóficamente bien fundada del significado de educación, 
como en relación con los errores de quienes sostienen un significado 
torcido. Con una metáfora, podría decir que la lectura del libro ha sido 
como asistir a la interpretación de una pieza musical ya consagrada por la 
historia de la música, o volver a ver la película que marcó un cambio de 
época en el cine, y que el Prof. Barrio hubiese sido un gran intérprete o un 
gran cineasta, si hubieran sido éstos los ámbitos de su dedicación 
profesional. 
 Sin embargo, paralelamente al gozo que me ha proporcionado la 
lectura del libro, en lo profundo me late una cierta decepción, como si 
fuera una tentación a toda luz perversa, que no acabo de sofocar. Este 
sentimiento creo que se debe a que el trabajo adolece de la falta de 
originalidad que se espera de un pensador de la categoría de José María 
Barrio, como lo demuestran sus publicaciones y en sus reiteradas 
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intervenciones en el foro académico. Ello se aprecia principalmente en la 
primera parte del libro, en el que sumariamente aborda el concepto de 
persona y su crecimiento a través de los hábitos, como fundamento 
antropológico de los desarrollos posteriores sobre los déficits del discurso 
pedagógico moderno, y sobre el diálogo significativo como la herramienta 
esencial del proceso educativo. 
 En esta fundamentación, nuestro autor recurre a las consabidas 
nociones que la filosofía tradicional ofrece en su indagación sobre el ser 
humano, como son el de “naturaleza”, o el de “segunda naturaleza” en 
función de un inacabamiento en dependencia de las operaciones del 
sujeto y de la adquisición de “hábitos”, con la consiguiente identidad 
sobrevenida del sujeto. Digo nociones consabidas, como lo muestra el 
hecho de que el propio autor suelta en su texto términos sin explicar, cuyo 
sentido supone que el lector ya conoce, como cuando dice que “la 
naturaleza primaria es hipóstasis e hipóstasis sustancial de la segunda” 
(p.27). Amparándose en las limitaciones del trabajo para ahondar en el 
concepto de persona, el Prof. Barrio asume la conocida definición de 
Boecio: rationalis naturae individua substantia, destacando en ella un 
centro ontológico subsistente, intrínsecamente indiviso, unido a su 
posibilidad de autotrascenderse, por su capacidad de abrirse al horizonte 
potencialmente irrestricto de lo otro. En el plano de la operación, estos 
dos polos, señala Barrio, son constitutivos de un “yo” capaz de entender y 
querer, esencialmente dotado para la intimidad y la extraversión. Se alude 
también a la conexión del alma y el cuerpo como unión “hilemórfica”, y, 
en base a lo que denomina “permeabilidad ontológica” del ser humano 
(p.36), se asume sin objeción el afán del pensamiento clásico de 
identificar al sujeto en co-actualidad con su dinamismo operativo, que está 
abierto a la totalidad de lo real bajo la doble formalidad de lo verdadero y 
de lo bueno. Así se trae la antigua idea de que el hombre es 
un microcosmos, pues debido a su naturaleza intelectual puede 
posesionarse de todo lo real como horizonte objetual, adquiriendo con ello 
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forma sustancial como elemento ontológico radical por el cual la persona 
subsiste. Igualmente, la propuesta que se ofrece sobre la formación de 
hábitos, como la clave del crecimiento de la persona, no es más que una 
reiteración del planteamiento clásico. 
 Estoy convencido de que un pensador de la categoría de José María 
Barrio puede y debe aspirar a algo más que a divulgar o actuar de vocero 
de lo ya sabido, por muy arduo y exigente que ya sea este trabajo. Se 
espera de él un avance en la solución de problemas planteados por el 
pensamiento moderno, que revelan cierto agotamiento de las categorías 
clásicas. Pienso ahora en el de si es aceptable reducir el ser del hombre 
únicamente a la categor a de “sustancia”, para resolver después la 
cuestión de su identidad como “segunda naturaleza” al haz de relaciones 
que mantiene con el universo. Porque es evidente que la repetición que el 
hombre mantiene respecto al mundo, por la que se concibe como 
un microcosmos, ha de redundar por fuerza en su principio constitutivo. 
La repetición no puede ser solo relativa y simétrica con el universo, en 
cuanto la persona lo repite desde sí, y, en este sentido, la persona está 
fuera del mundo, se sale de él. Consecuentemente, su determinación 
esencial no puede entrar de lleno en la categor a de “sustancia”, pues ésta 
es indicativa de una principiación radical fija, propia de la estructura óntica 
del universo. 
 Si el alma es en cierto modo todas las cosas, ese “cierto modo” 
indica que no hay confusión o unicidad entre hombre y cosas, sino que el 
ser del hombre tiene su propia prioridad, distinta del sentido físico de 
prioridad que domina el “ente”, que no alcanza a cubrir la riqueza del “ser 
personal”. Cabe decir que el universo es creado, y que la persona también 
es creada, pero no como parte del universo, sino como “segunda 
criatura”, y, por ello, más allá de su consideración como sustancia, la 
persona ha de pensarse en el orden del Origen, ya que su radicalidad no 
se consuma en su operar, en cuanto el mundo lo repite desde sí, como ya 
se ha dicho. Consecuentemente, en la persona el significado de “relación” 
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ha de ser más profundo que el de “subsistencia” que es lo propio del 
orden sustancial. Lo contrario sería antropoformizar la naturaleza, 
haciendo depender el estatuto de lo real de la objetualidad pensada o 
querida, o declarar el naturalismo del antropos como ocurre con cualquier 
panteísmo causalista3. 
 El fijismo en lo que se ha venido a denominar la “filosof a perenne” 
encuentra dificultades para afrontar algunos problemas, o para avanzar 
cuando se plantean otros nuevos, que suelen ser agudos en el terreno de 
la teoría de la educación. Ello se aprecia en cómo afronta Etienne Gilson, 
en su destacado libro El espíritu de la filosofía medieval4, la acusación de 
incoherencia en la doctrina de San Bernardo sobre el amor. En esta 
doctrina se encuentran dos tendencias enfrentadas: la del amor “natural”, 
como tendencia de los seres creados a buscar su propio bien, y la del 
amor “extático”, que corta todos los vínculos que parecen unir el amor a 
las inclinaciones egoístas, según el precepto divino amarás a Dios sobre 
todas las cosas. En la Epistola de Caritate (1125) San Bernardo incurre en 
la incoherencia de juntar ambas tendencias en una pretendida visión 
unitaria de amor, al afirmar que nuestro amor “comienza necesariamente 
por nosotros mismos”, y que el fin de ese amor de s  mismo es entrar en 
la dicha de Dios, de entrar “como olvidándose de s  de manera 
maravillosa, y como separándose enteramente de s ” (p.388). 
 En su defensa, Gilson aduce que el amor “natural” no es un mandato 
de Dios, pero tampoco una falta, sino el resultado de la falta debida al 
pecado original: “porque nacemos de la concupiscencia de la carne es 
menester que nuestro amor, o nuestra codicia, pues es lo mismo, 
comience por la carne” (p.390). Gilson toma as  la “naturaleza” del 
hombre en su estado histórico concreto, después de la caída, pero la 
ca da, continúa diciendo, solo se mide en relación con la “gracia”, que 
                                                 
3 POLO, L.: “La coexistencia del hombre”. Conferencia de L. Polo en las XXV Reuniones 
filosóficas, Pamplona (1988). http://www.leonardopolo.net/textos/coexis.htm 
4 GILSON, E.: El espíritu de la filosofía medieval. Rialp, Madrid, 1981. 
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también se incluye en la naturaleza, pues Dios creó al hombre en estado 
de gracia, y aun cuando el hombre la perdió, todavía puede recuperarla 
porque todavía guarda su forma, y aun en sus miserias sigue siendo etiam 
sic aeternitatis capax. Y, confusamente, añade: “sin duda, la grandeza del 
alma no es idéntica al alma, pero es como (¿?) su forma, (…) de modo 
que el alma es distinta de lo que hace su grandeza, pero, por otra parte, 
no puede perder su forma sin dejar de ser ella misma, de suerte que no 
se puede concebir que se la separe nunca” (p.391). 
 El pensamiento resbala cuando se hace depender la “naturaleza” del 
hombre de una contingencia histórica, si se alude a ella en el plano 
metafísico, y el golpe es rotundo al constatar el malabarismo con que 
Gilson maneja la “forma”, que es indicativa del sustrato por el cual el 
compuesto hilemórfico permanece siempre único e idéntico a sí mismo, 
prescindiendo de las particularidades exteriores. ¿Cómo es posible que el 
alma no pueda perder su forma sin dejar de ser ella misma, a la vez que 
la forma del alma, en tanto que conserva su grandeza, no sea idéntica al 
alma? Al decir que la grandeza es la forma del alma, a la vez la excluye si 
afirma que la grandeza del alma no es idéntica al alma, pues el alma no 
puede perder su forma sin dejar de ser ella misma, y por eso Gilson se 
ampara en el adverbio “como” para aludir a la forma que incluye la 
grandeza, como también podr a haber dicho que “más o menos” es su 
forma, o que lo es “aproximadamente”. 
 Estamos hechos a imagen y semejanza de Dios, en quien esencia y 
existencia se identifican. No hay más que un Dios y este Dios es el Ser, 
dice Gilson en otro lugar de su libro. Y si Dios es el Ser y el único Ser, 
todo lo que no es Dios no puede recibir la existencia sino de Él. 
Consecuentemente, producir el ser pura y simplemente es la acción propia 
del Ser mismo como consecuencia de un acto creador, que no solamente 
ha dado existencia al mundo, sino que la conserva en cada uno de los 
momentos sucesivos de su duración. El mundo se encuentra en una 
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dependencia tal de su Creador que le afecta de contingencia hasta en la 
raíz de su ser. 
 Gilson prosigue su argumento en favor de San Bernardo reiterando 
que lo que permanece semejante a Dios, después del pecado, es la 
grandeza del alma, su “forma” (p.392). Lo desemejante es su encorvadura 
hacia la tierra, constitutiva de una esencia que es “falsa”, si se interpreta a 
sensu contrario su calificación de “verdadera esencia” del alma la que 
incluye su grandeza. Se repite el malabarismo en el uso de la noción de 
forma, pues si antes afirmó que el alma no puede perder su forma sin 
dejar de ser ella misma, y la forma del alma es su grandeza, se concluye 
no somos reales mientras no la lleguemos a alcanzar. 
 Gilson califica de sorprendente y admirable la semejanza que 
acompaña a la visión de Dios, con la que el alma se identifica, como si 
fuera una misma cosa ver a Dios y hacerse semejante a Él. Entre Dios y el 
hombre habría entonces una perfecta unión espiritual, mutua visión y 
amor recíproco. Entonces el alma conocerá a Dios como éste la conoce, le 
amará como Él la ama (p.393). No se entiende bien cómo un ser 
contingente, como es el hombre, pueda identificarse con un Dios que es 
principio y raíz de su ser remitiendo dicha identidad al nivel de la 
operación. Sin salirse del l mite “sustancialista” que impregna su 
pensamiento, Gilson reitera más adelante que amar a Dios es “estar unido 
a él de voluntad, reproducir en sí la  ley divina, vivir como Dios”, y añade: 
“en una palabra: deificarse” (p.394). Éste término podría insinuar que la 
radicalidad de la persona desborda la radicalidad propia de la sustancia, y 
que su relación con Dios se resuelve en el orden de la principiación. Por 
eso el hombre se “deifica”, se relaciona con Dios al modo de una 
intensificación y perfeccionamiento de su acto de ser, por encima de su 
dinamismo operativo. Consecuentemente, el pecado se dir a “original”, no 
por su emplazamiento temporal al comienzo de la historia, como sostiene 
Gilson, sino como resultado de una ca da de su “entidad” relativa al 
Origen, es decir, relativa a la principiación radical de su ser en el estado 
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inicial de gracia con que fue creado. Se podría decir que su 
distanciamiento de Dios no es “orográfico” sino “esencial”, en cuanto Dios 
es más radical en la persona que ella misma en su intimidad. Por 
consiguiente, la vuelta a su estado primigenio no es función de su 
dinamismo operativo sino el resultado de una transformación “tabórica”, 
se podría decir, cuyo  término, en cuanto está en el ámbito de la donación 
del ser, no lo puede por ella misma alcanzar. 
 Las reflexiones que se han hecho hasta aquí, en relación con el libro 
del Prof. Barrio, me llevan a afirmar nego maiorem en relación con 
presupuesto básico en que se  inspira, como es el concepto 
“sustancialista” de persona. De ello no se sigue ergo nego consequentiam, 
ya que considero válidos los desarrollos derivados un saber ya consolidado 
y justamente calificado como “perenne”, pero que están a la espera de 
recibir un enriquecimiento derivado de la profundización en dicho 
concepto nuclear en la antropología filosófica. 
 Este tipo de cuestiones, capaces de avivar el potencial de la mente, y 
entusiasmar a los aficionados, son las que desearía encontrar en los 
escritos e intervenciones de mi amigo José María, a quien leo entretenido 
y muy a gusto, pero con la nostalgia de saber que no voy a encontrar sino 
una reiteración, con añadidos y ornamentos, de lo ya sabido. Estoy 
convencido de que un pensador de raza como es él podría conquistar 
horizontes que aún están sin explorar, y por ello le animo a que deje el 
regazo de su maestro y se encarame a sus hombros, aun con el riesgo de 
caer, para ver lo que él no vio, y que asuma su parte en la responsabilidad 
de desvelar la verdad, aunque sea solo la suya. 
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 Historia cultural del humanismo es un documentado estudio 
antropológico sobre la esencia del hombre, es decir, sobre qué es ser 
hombre, escrito de una manera clara y que, además, sostiene unas 
tesis teóricas dignas de atención. La obra, por otro lado, encaja 
perfectamente en la producción filosófica de su autor; y de él recoge la 
brillantez expositiva, solidez argumentativa y rigurosa documentación 
que le caracterizan. 
 El libro está dividido en seis capítulos. Los dos primeros un 
poco más generales: sobre la noción de historia cultural, o sobre el 
carácter histórico de la cultura (c. 1), y sobre la progresiva extensión, 
ampliación en el tiempo, del humanismo, de la noción de lo humano (c. 
2). Los cuatro capítulos siguientes son más particulares, pues estudian 
lo humano, figuras de lo humano dice, en las relaciones económicas de 
producción, de propiedad (c. 3), y en la comunicación lingüística, 
especialmente en la escritura (c. 5); así como la evolución de los 
asentamientos y organizaciones de la convivencia humana, desde la 
cueva y el poblado, hasta el estado y las organizaciones 
supranacionales (c. 4). El capítulo final es conclusivo, y justifica la 
posición teórica del autor; especialmente importante entiendo su 
apartado 2: la infraestructura de la definición del hombre. 
 La tesis global del libro, bien expuesta y justificada en él, me 
parece que se percibe ya en el prólogo. Y creo que se podría exponer, 
con frases del mismo, de esta manera. 
 Al ser humano se le llamó "hombre" en el mundo grecorromano 
clásico, "persona" en el mundo cristiano medieval, "sujeto" en el mundo 
ilustrado moderno; y, tras la liquidación de la modernidad, se le llama 
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"existente", y no se le interpreta como subsistente y autónomo, sino 
como inmerso en la vida o como inscrito en el tiempo. El hombre se ha 
entendido a sí mismo, y ha establecido qué es lo humano, de muy 
distintas maneras a lo largo del tiempo. Desde la variación histórica de 
estos enfoques es como este libro estudia el ideal de humanitas que ha 
tenido vigencia en los diversos momentos de la cultura occidental. 
 La consideración de estos cambios acontecidos en la historia, 
encuentra un cierto punto medular en la observación aristotélica según 
la cual sin ciudad, sin polis, no hay propiamente hombre, porque el 
hombre es social por naturaleza. Esa observación abre el campo a las 
preguntas sobre cómo era el hombre y lo humano antes de la aparición 
de la polis, en el paleolítico; y sobre cómo podrá ser tras la 
desaparición de la polis (período postneolítico que, según reconocidos 
autores, puede haber ocurrido y estar ocurriendo ya, desde la segunda 
mitad del siglo XX). De acuerdo con esas preguntas cabe examinar el 
humanismo en una escala temporal inédita. 
 Por lo demás, ese examen no sólo tiene un interés histórico, 
sino temático. Porque, si la plenitud de la esencia humana es 
correlativa con la polis, el examen de los factores determinantes de la 
aparición y la desaparición de la ciudad (que el autor ubica en la 
economía de producción, la propiedad inmobiliaria y la escritura, a ello 
obedecen los capítulos mencionados), o la indagación de en qué 
medida convergen o colisionan estos factores, determinará también las 
condiciones de aparición y disolución de la misma esencia humana. Con 
todo, ni muerte del hombre, ni disolución de lo humano, ni 
antihumanismo; sino más bien una nueva comprensión de lo humano 
vinculada a una escala temporal más amplia. 
 La lectura de este libro, no sólo para especialistas, sino para 
cualquier persona culta, universitaria, interesada en el tema, arroja un 
neto balance: no hay conflicto entre naturaleza humana e historia, sino, 
en todo caso, flexión de aquella en ésta. Pero además suscita alguna 
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otra cuestión. Porque también cabe distinguir persona y naturaleza, y 
entonces sospechar que el hombre como persona es algo más que un 
ser humano: de aquí la historia del humanismo. No es difícil sospechar 
que la libertad personal es ese plus. Y entonces la historia de su 
humanismo una buena muestra del ejercicio de su libertad. 
 
Juan García González 
Málaga, 24.VII.2013 
 
